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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the enormous growth of cyber activity and Internet penetration, the number
of cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Detection of these
attacks has always been a major concern for many governments and organizations all
over the world. Some of the recent well-known cyber attacks include Nimda attack,
SQL Slammer attack, July 2009 attacks, and Operation Aurora. The Operation
Aurora cyber attacks were launched against major organizations like Google, Yahoo,
Adobe Systems, Morgan Stanley, Dow Chemical Company, etc. in the second half of
2009. Recently in April 2011, a series of cyber attacks were launched against Sony’s
PlayStation Network which made the network go oﬄine for about 24 days. In May
2011, cyber attacks were launched against Citibank and the account information of
about 1% of its 21 million North American credit card customers was stolen. Such
cyber attacks incur great expenses and trouble to several organizations. In April
2009, the Pentagon announced that more than $100 million were spent on repairing
the damage from the cyber attacks over the past six months. In May 2011, Sony
Corporation declared that the cost of its PlayStation Network attack was about $171
million.
Moreover, the computing systems and networks in the critical sectors like military,
banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, medical etc. are vulnerable
to these growing cyber threats. Military and financial organizations are always the
top target for attackers. The protection of the sensitive data from cyber attacks in
the critical sectors like these, is now the topmost priority for government and other
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organizations. Nowadays, politically motivated cyber attacks are also increasing in
number. The Economist describes the cyberwarfare as the fifth domain of warfare
after land, sea, air, and space. In May 2010, a new agency called the United States
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was established by the U.S. government to ex-
clusively protect and defend its military networks. Similar agencies were set up by
other countries as well to protect their digital infrastructure.
1.1 Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks
A cyber attack (or intrusion) can be defined as a series of malicious computer activi-
ties that threaten and compromise the security and integrity of a computer/network
system. The cyber attacks disrupt the normal operation of a computer system, and
may illegally access or destroy the information in the computer systems. Most of the
time, a cyber attack is launched through the data stream on the computer networks.
The classification of cyber attacks is helpful for learning the behavior of different at-
tacks, which may be used in the design of cyber attack detection systems. In general,
cyber attacks can be broadly classified into the following four categories:
1. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
are those that make a computer resource (e.g., a Web server) unavailable to
the actual legitimate users. The most common form of the DoS attack involves
making the computer resource too busy and fully loaded with lots of unnecessary
requests, so that the actual users cannot use it. There are many variants of DoS
attacks including TCP-SYN Flood, ICMP/UDP Flood, Smurf, Ping of Death,
Teardrop, Mailbomb, Apache2.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are the most common cyber attacks. The most
popular variant of the DoS attack is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack. As the name itself suggests, DDoS attacks are launched in a distributed
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fashion. Most often in the case of DoS attacks, the victim’s computing resource
is more powerful than the attacker’s computing resource. In such cases, the DoS
attacker launches the attack using several multiple intermediate hosts (generally
called bots).
2. Remote to Local (R2L) Attacks: In this type of attacks, an attacker tries
to illegally gain local access to a computer system, by sending some packets to
the system over a network. Some common ways in which this is accomplished
is guessing passwords through the brute-force dictionary method, FTP Write,
etc.
3. User to Root (U2R) Attacks: In this class of attacks, an attacker with
a normal user privileges illegally tries to gain the root access (administrator
privileges) to a computer system. One common way in which this is done is by
using the buffer overflow methods.
4. Probing Attacks: In this type of attacks, an attacker scans a network/computer
to find possible vulnerabilities through which the attacker can exploit the sys-
tem. This is like some sort of surveillance on the system. One common way in
which this is done is through port scanning. By scanning the different ports of
a computer system, the attacker can get the information about the open ports,
services running, what the hosts in a network are up to, and various other sensi-
tive details like the IP address, MAC address, firewall rules, etc. Some examples
of probing attacks are IPSweep, NMap, MScan, Satan, SAINT.
There are other attacks such as the Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, Social
Engineering attacks, etc. However, these attacks can be prevented by following some
personal security measures. For example, MITM attack is a sort of active eaves-
dropping in which the attacker hears the conversation between the victims. This
is generally done by establishing separate and independent connections with each
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victim, and relaying messages between them without them even knowing it. This
MITM attack can be prevented by using strong encryption schemes like the Secure
Shell (SSH) protocol, which prevents the attacker from reading the messages.
1.2 Motivation
Cyber attacks have become a major threat nowadays. The cost of damage from a
cyber attack is very huge. Protecting the computer networks from these cyber attacks
has become the topmost priority. Thus, the problem of cyber attack detection is of
great importance. There is an urgent need for an efficient cyber attack detection sys-
tem, which can accurately detect the cyber attacks in time so that proper countering
actions can be taken to protect the vital cyber infrastructure. Most of the current
cyber attack detection systems suffer from two main issues:
1. High computational complexity
2. Low detection accuracy
There is generally a trade-off between these two. In general, the cyber attack detection
system with high detection accuracy suffers from high computational complexity. One
of the main challenges in designing a cyber attack detection system is to decrease the
overall computational complexity of the system without any decrease in its detection
accuracy. The focus of this thesis is to address this challenge. In this thesis, a new
cyber attack detection system is proposed which has relatively less computational
complexity and high detection accuracy.
1.3 Thesis Organization
In this chapter, different types of cyber attacks were introduced. The behavior of
different attacks is presented in detail.
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In Chapter 2, different cyber attack detection systems are introduced. The relative
merits and demerits of those cyber attack detection systems are discussed. Then, the
proposed distributed cyber attack detection system is described in detail.
In Chapter 3, the support vector machines which are used as the binary classifiers
in the proposed cyber attack detection system are presented. The support vector
machines are generally the best supervised classifiers, and yield the best classification
performance. The support vector machines are discussed in detail in this chapter.
In Chapter 4, several fast training approaches to train the support vector machine
are discussed. Though the support vector machines are the best classifiers, their
training procedure has high computational complexity. This often limits the use of
support vector machines in the real-world applications involving huge data (for e.g.,
cyber attack detection). In this chapter, several existing fast training approaches
for support vector machines are presented. Finally, a new fast and efficient training
approach for support vector machines is proposed which reduces the support vector
machine training complexity without having significant degradation in the classifica-
tion performance of the support vector machine.
In Chapter 5, the fusion rules used in the proposed distributed cyber attack de-
tection system are discussed. Effective fusion rules are proposed using the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence.
In Chapter 6, the experimental results are provided. Conclusions are provided in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
CYBER ATTACK DETECTION SYSTEMS
The cyber attack detection system, also referred to as the intrusion detection system
(IDS), continuously monitors the computer/network system trying to identify the
cyber attacks while they are going on a computer/network system. Once an attack
is detected, the cyber attack detection system alerts the corresponding security pro-
fessional who then takes a necessary action. The design of the cyber attack detection
system is generally based on the basic assumption that the cyber attack activities are
different from the normal activities and hence can be detected [1].
Generally the cyber attack detection systems or intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
are classified into two main categories:
1. Signature-based intrusion detection systems
2. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems
The signature-based intrusion detection system is based on the prior knowledge of
known attack signatures. In this approach, an activity is classified as an attack if it
matches with an already known attack signature. Therefore the performance of this
approach is greatly limited by the signature database available. This approach cannot
detect novel attacks, which are quite different from the known attacks. Moreover,
defining signatures for all the known attacks is in general difficult. There is a great
need for expert knowledge to create the attack signatures. Any error in the attack
signature definitions may lead to a large number of missed detections. The common
techniques adopted include pattern matching, and rule-based techniques. Some best
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examples of signature-based intrusion detection systems are Snort [2], Bro [3], and
Prelude [4].
In the anomaly-based intrusion detection system, an assumption that a cyber
attack will always show some deviations from normal patterns is made. First, a normal
profile of the system is developed. Then, all the activities that do not match with this
normal profile are considered to be attacks. The major drawback in this approach
is the difficulty in accurately modeling the normal behavior of the system, which
can be highly dynamic. Furthermore, the assumption that the abnormal behavior is
only due to attacks is another limitation. To summarize, though the anomaly-based
intrusion detection system may sometimes detect novel attacks, the biggest drawback
is the lack of accurate profiling of the normal behaviors of a system. This is in general
difficult, and this may lead to a very large number of false alarms.
If we observe the conventional intrusion detection approaches mentioned above,
it is clear that both of them completely rely on explicit pattern matching techniques.
That is, all the activities matching with the known attack signatures are consid-
ered to be attacks in the signature-based detection approach, and all the activities
not matching with the system’s normal profile are considered to be attacks in the
anomaly-based detection approach. It is clear that they perform good when the at-
tacks are somewhat similar and regular. But the attacks in general are not regular.
Novel attacks are being developed day by day. And the conventional detection ap-
proaches cannot adapt to the new attacks that are being developed. Therefore, there
is a need for an adaptive intrusion detection approach. The above mentioned difficul-
ties lead researchers to apply the pattern classification techniques to the problem of
intrusion detection, where the normal and attack models with appropriate decision
rules are automatically learned by the system. Hence, these systems are adaptive
to new unforeseen attacks. The main advantage of using these pattern classification
techniques is their ability to generalize, learn and adapt.
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The intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can also be classified into the following
categories based on the type of data they collect:
1. Host-based intrusion detection systems: These IDSs monitor the indi-
vidual host systems in a network. They often collect a number of system level
details like system calls, application logs, incoming and outgoing network events,
system file changes, etc. An example of a host-based intrusion detection system
is OSSEC [5].
2. Network-based intrusion detection systems: A network-based IDS moni-
tors the whole network for signs of an ongoing attack. It examines the overall
network traffic and observes different hosts as well. These network-based IDSs
access the network traffic through a network tap, or by connecting to a network
switch configured for port mirroring. An example of a network-based IDS is the
well known Snort [2]. Another open-source network-based IDS is the Bro [3].
An example of commercial network-based IDS is the McAfee Network Security
Platform [6].
3. Application-based intrusion detection systems: These IDSs monitor only
a specific application by collecting the corresponding necessary data. They
use external sensors that capture the data exchanged between the monitored
application and other third party entities with which the application interacts.
4. Hybrid intrusion detection systems: These IDSs are a combination of two
or more of the above described IDSs.
2.1 Proposed Cyber Attack Detection System
In this thesis, a new network-based cyber attack detection system (intrusion detection
system) is proposed. The proposed cyber attack detection system is designed in a
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distributed fashion, using multiple sources of information (sensors). The sensing
technology has greatly improved in recent times, and a wide variety of advanced
sensors are now available which can collect a lot of information from the network.
Each sensor is a source of information which independently operates and collects
different types of data from the network. Using a variety of multiple sensors, we can
have a complete view of the network and hence the cyber attacks can be detected
more accurately.
The data collected from all the sensors in the system can be processed in two ways:
centralized approach and decentralized (or distributed) approach. In the centralized
processing approach, each sensor transmits its entire data to a central unit. The
central unit receives the data from all the sensors and processes it to generate a final
decision. This traditional centralized processing approach has high computational
complexity, requires huge bandwidth, and is practically inefficient. On the other
hand, the distributed processing approach is more efficient and has relatively less
computational complexity. In this distributed approach, each sensor first process its
data and generates a local decision. All the local decisions from all the sensors are
then transmitted to the central unit (generally referred to as the fusion center), which
then generates the final decision based on all the available local decisions. Clearly,
this distributed approach is computationally more efficient and requires very less
bandwidth. Moreover with the recent advancements in the field of sensing, currently
available sensors all have computing capabilities. Thus we propose a new distributed
cyber attack detection system which is robust and efficient than the traditional ones.
Let us assume there are L − 1 known types of cyber attacks. Thus there are
a total of L classes including the normal class. Let there be M sensors, which are
distributed wide across the network observing different aspects of the network under
consideration. Each sensor processes the observed data and makes a local decision
regarding the network condition. The local decision of the sensor Sj is uj. All
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these local decisions are then transmitted to the fusion center, which generates the
final decision about the state of the network using the available local decisions. The
proposed distributed cyber attack detection system is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Proposed distributed cyber attack detection system.
At each sensor, there are L binary classifiers with each classifier distinguishing
one class from the rest. Let gji (·) denote the binary classifier i at the sensor j. The
binary classifier gji (·) at the sensor j classifies the observed data record into either
“belonging to class i” or “not belonging to class i.” The proposed local fusion rule
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at each sensor generates the corresponding local decision based on the outputs of the
L binary classifiers. This is clearly shown in Figure 2.2.
The binary classifiers in the proposed system are designed using the machine
learning (statistical learning) approach. In general, we assume that we initially have
data (generally referred to as the training data) of different types of cyber attacks
available. All the binary classifiers are initially trained on this available training
data. Gradually over time, when the data about the new types of cyber attacks
becomes available, the training data is updated and the classifiers are retrained using
the updated training data. In order to decrease the computational complexity of the
classifier training process, a new fast and efficient training method is proposed in this
thesis. Effective fusion rules, at the sensors and the fusion center, are proposed using
the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence.
12
Figure 2.2: Local decision at each sensor in the system.
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CHAPTER 3
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES
In this chapter, we describe in detail the support vector machine (SVM), which is
used as the binary classifier in our proposed cyber attack detection system. Support
vector machine (SVM) is generally considered to be the best off-the-shelf supervised
classifier. The SVM tends to find a decision boundary (hyperplane) between the two
classes, which lies at a maximum distance from both the classes. The main advantage
of the support vector machines (SVMs) is that the parameters are found by solving
a convex optimization problem, which makes the solution globally optimal.
The support vector machine (SVM) is a sparse kernel method. Kernel methods
are a special class of pattern classification techniques, in which the decisions (or
predictions) are made using the entire training data, or a subset of it. The support
vector machine (SVM) is a kernel method with sparse solution. The SVM decisions
(or predictions) are made using only few training data points.
The problem of supervised binary classification can be formulated as follows. The
training set T = {(xi, yi); i = 1, ..., n} is given. The training sample xi has d features,
i.e., xi ∈ Rd. Thus each training sample xi is a point in Rd space. The label of
the sample xi is yi ∈ {−1,+1} corresponding to two different classes. The SVM
classifier design is to learn a function y = f(x) which not only classifies the training
data accurately but also generalizes well to the new samples (samples with unknown
labels). Mathematically, the SVM classifier can be defined as
y = f(x) = sgn(wTΦ(x) + b), (3.1)
where w and b are the parameters of the SVM, and Φ(·) denotes a nonlinear feature
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space mapping which transforms the original d-dimensional input space into some
higher dimensional feature (Hilbert) space. From (3.1), it is clear that the SVM
parameters w and b define a linear hyperplane in the feature space corresponding
to the nonlinear mapping Φ(·). The optimal values of the SVM parameters w and
b are found by solving a convex optimization problem which maximizes the margin
between the two classes.
3.1 Margins and Maximum Margin Classifiers
First, we discuss the concept of margins. Figure 3.1 shows the decision boundary be-
tween two classes. The parameter vector w is orthogonal to the decision hyperplane.
Consider a training sample (data point) at A. The geometric margin (or simply mar-
gin) of the decision boundary with respect to this training sample A is the distance of
the point A to the decision boundary. This margin is represented by the line segment
AB in Figure 3.1. Mathematically, the margin of the decision boundary represented
by the parameters (w, b) with respect to a training sample (xi, yi) is defined as
γi = yi
((
w
‖w‖
)T
xi +
b
‖w‖
)
. (3.2)
Using the notion of margins, the optimal classifier with good generalization is
the one which maximizes the margin with respect to the entire training set T =
{(xi, yi); i = 1, ..., n}. Such classifiers that separate the training samples with the
maximum margin (large gap) are called maximum margin classifiers. The support
vector machine (SVM) is one such maximum margin classifier. Given a training set
T = {(xi, yi); i = 1, ..., n}, the support vector machine (SVM) tries to solve the
following optimization problem:
max
w,b
γ
s.t. yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ γ, i = 1, ..., n
‖w‖ = 1.
(3.3)
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Figure 3.1: Geometric margins.
In the above optimization problem we are trying to maximize the margin γ, subject
to the constraint that every training sample has the margin at least γ. The solution
of the optimization problem (3.3) gives the hyperplane (w, b) with the largest possible
margin with respect to the entire training set.
The above optimization problem (3.3) cannot be solved directly, as the constraint
‖w‖ = 1 is a nonconvex one. We can try to embed the constraint ‖w‖ = 1 into the
objective function, which results in the following optimization problem:
max
w,b
γˆ
‖w‖
s.t. yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ γˆ, i = 1, ..., n
(3.4)
Solving this optimization problem (3.4) is also in general difficult as the objective
function in (3.4) is a nonconvex one. To transform this optimization problem (3.4)
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into a convex one, we make use of the fact that scaling the parameters (w, b) does
not affect the geometric margin. This is clear from the equation (3.2). We scale the
parameters (w, b) by some factor such that γˆ = 1. Now the objective function of the
optimization problem (3.4) becomes 1‖w‖ . Moreover, maximizing
1
‖w‖ is equivalent to
minimizing ‖w‖2. So we now have the following optimization problem:
min
w,b
1
2
‖w‖2
s.t. yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., n
(3.5)
The scaling factor 1
2
in the objective function is introduced for mathematical con-
venience. This optimization problem (3.5) is a convex one. More precisely, the
optimization problem (3.5) is a quadratic programming (QP) problem, which tries to
minimize a quadratic function subject to a set of linear inequality constraints.
In practice, the dual problem of the above problem is solved. The Lagrangian of
the above problem (3.5) is
L(w, b,λ) =
1
2
‖w‖2 −
n∑
i=1
λi(yi(w
Txi + b)− 1), (3.6)
where λ = {λi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} are the Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrange dual
function (or simply dual function) is
D(λ) = inf
w,b
L(w, b,λ)
= inf
w,b
(
1
2
‖w‖2 −
n∑
i=1
λi(yi(w
Txi + b)− 1)
)
.
(3.7)
The Lagrange dual function is the minimum value of the Lagrangian over the pa-
rameters (w, b). To find the dual function, we first need to set the derivatives of the
Lagrangian L(w, b,λ) with respect to w and b equal to zero.
∇wL(w, b,λ) = w−
n∑
i=1
λiyixi = 0, (3.8a)
∂
∂b
L(w, b,λ) =
n∑
i=1
λiyi = 0. (3.8b)
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From (3.8a), we have
w =
n∑
i=1
λiyixi. (3.9)
Plugging the value of w from (3.9) into the Lagrangian (3.6), we get
L(b,λ) =
n∑
i=1
λi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
yiyjλiλj(xi)
Txj − b
n∑
i=1
λiyi. (3.10)
From (3.8b), the last term on the RHS of the above equation is zero. Finally, the
Lagrange dual function is
D(λ) =
n∑
i=1
λi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
yiyjλiλj(xi)
Txj. (3.11)
The Lagrange dual function (3.11) gives lower bounds on the optimal value of the
original primal problem (3.5). If p? is the optimal value of the primal optimization
problem (3.5), then for any λ ≥ 0 we have
D(λ) ≤ p?. (3.12)
It is clear that the Lagrange dual function D(λ) gives lower bound on the optimal
value p? of the primal optimization problem (3.5) for every λ ≥ 0. The best lower
bound that can be given by the dual function can be found by the following optimiza-
tion problem, which is called the Lagrange dual problem (or simply dual problem).
max
λ
D(λ)
s.t. λ ≥ 0.
(3.13)
The dual problem of our original optimization problem (3.5) is
max
λ
D(λ) =
n∑
i=1
λi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
yiyjλiλj(xi)
Txj
s.t. λi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
n∑
i=1
λiyi = 0.
(3.14)
The above dual problem (3.14) is also a quadratic programming (QP) problem, which
tries to minimize a quadratic function subject to a set of inequality and equality
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constraints. Let d? denote the optimal value of the above dual problem (3.14). Thus,
by definition, we always have d? ≤ p?. The nonnegative quantity p?− d? is called the
duality gap. In order to actually solve the dual problem (3.14) in place of the original
primal problem (3.5), we need to have zero duality gap, i.e., d? = p?. In order to have
zero duality gap, the primal optimal points (w?, b?) and the dual optimal point λ?
must satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:
yi(w
?Txi + b
?) ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., n (3.15a)
λ?i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n (3.15b)
λ?i (1− yi(w?Txi + b?)) = 0, i = 1, ..., n (3.15c)
∇(w,b)L(w?, b?,λ?) = 0. (3.15d)
These KKT conditions hold in our case here. The KKT condition (3.15c) is an
important one, which is generally referred to as the KKT dual complementarity con-
dition. It states that, for every data point xi, either the corresponding λi = 0 or
yi(w
?Txi + b
?) = 1. Thus we can solve the dual problem (3.14) instead of the original
primal problem (3.5). The various algorithms used to solve the dual problem (3.14)
are discussed later in this chapter.
Once the dual problem (3.14) is solved, we get the dual optimal point λ?. Having
found the dual optimal point λ?, we can find the primal optimal point w? using (3.9).
The optimal value b? can be calculated using (3.9) and the KKT dual complementarity
condition (3.15c). In order to classify new samples using the trained SVM (w?, b?),
we just need to evaluate the sign of the quantity f(x) = w?Tx + b?. Using (3.9), we
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have
f(x) = w?Tx + b?
=
(
n∑
i=1
λ?i yixi
)T
x + b?
=
n∑
i=1
λ?i yi (xi)
T x + b?
=
n∑
i=1
λ?i yi 〈xi,x〉+ b?,
(3.16)
where 〈xi,x〉 represents the inner product between the points xi and x. The optimal
value b? in the above equation can be directly calculated using (3.9) and the KKT dual
complementarity condition (3.15c). The value b? also depends only on the Lagrange
multipliers {λi}, training data points {xi}, and the training data labels {yi}. It is
clear from (3.16) that once the dual optimal point λ? is found by solving the dual
problem (3.14), the new data points can be classified directly using (3.16). There is
no need to explicitly calculate the primal optimal point (w?, b?) for future predictions
about new data points. From (3.16), it is clear that the quantity f(x) mainly depends
on the inner product between the new point x and the points in the training set. From
the the KKT dual complementarity condition (3.15c) and (3.16), it is clear that only
few data points have nonzero λi. Such points in the training set are called support
vectors, and hence the name support vector machine (SVM). All the training
data points except support vectors have λi = 0, and thus does not play any role in
forming the decision boundary and making predictions for new data points.
3.2 Nonlinear Feature Space Mapping and Kernel Trick
From the above discussion, it clear that the support vector machine (SVM) is a
maximum margin classifier which tries to separate the linearly separable data. Most
of the time in real-world situations, the data is not linearly separable in the original d-
dimensional input space I . However, the data can be linearly separable in some higher
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dimensional feature space (Hilbert space) H . Hence, the original input space I is
transformed into a higher dimensional feature space H through a general nonlinear
feature mapping Φ(·). The SVM is applied in this new higher dimensional space.
In order to do this, we need to replace x everywhere in the SVM algorithm with
Φ(x). Since the SVM algorithm can be expressed entirely using the inner product
〈xp,xq〉, we need to replace all such inner products with 〈Φ(xp),Φ(xq)〉. This new
inner product can be explicitly defined using a kernel function. For a given nonlinear
feature mapping Φ(·), the corresponding kernel function is defined as
K(xp,xq) =〈Φ(xp),Φ(xq)〉=(Φ(xp))TΦ(xq). (3.17)
Thus, we can just replace the inner product 〈xp,xq〉 everywhere in the SVM algorithm
by the corresponding kernel function K(xp,xq).
Given the nonlinear feature mapping Φ(·), the corresponding kernel K(·, ·) can be
easily calculated. But, sometimes determining the nonlinear feature mapping Φ(·) is
very difficult, especially in very high-dimensional cases. However most of the time,
we can efficiently construct the corresponding kernel function K(·, ·) directly without
even having to find the feature mapping Φ(·) explicitly. This is a huge advantage.
However, we need to make sure that the constructed function is a valid kernel, i.e.,
the constructed kernel function should correspond to a scalar product in some (high-
dimensional) feature space. One way to do this is to expand the chosen kernel function
and identify the corresponding mapping Φ(·). This may be difficult in some situations.
A more simple way to check whether a function is a valid kernel or not is to use the
Mercer’s condition.
For a function K(·, ·) to be valid kernel, corresponding to some nonlinear fea-
ture mapping Φ(·), it needs to satisfy the Mercer’s condition: Given a data set
{x1,x2, ...,xn}, K : Rd ×Rd 7→ R is a valid kernel if the corresponding kernel matrix
K is symmetric positive-semidefinite.
Thus, we can simply replace the inner product between the data points 〈xp,xq〉
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in the SVM algorithm with the kernel function K(xp,xq) corresponding to a higher
dimensional feature space, where the data is linearly separable, and apply the SVM
algorithm in the new feature space. This is generally referred to as the kernel trick,
which can be used for any classifier learning algorithms that can be explicitly ex-
pressed in terms of inner products between the data points.
Some examples of the kernels include:
• Linear kernel:
K(xp,xq) =
(
xTp xq
)
. (3.18)
This is the simplest kernel corresponding to the feature mapping Φ(x) = x.
• Polynomial kernel:
K(xp,xq) =
(
xTp xq
)d
, (3.19)
where d is the degree.
• Gaussian kernel:
K(xp,xq) = exp
(
−‖xp − xq‖
2
2σ2
)
. (3.20)
The Gaussian kernel (3.20) corresponds to an infinite dimensional feature map-
ping. The Gaussian kernel is also referred to as the radial basis function kernel
(RBF kernel).
• Hyberbolic tangent kernel:
K(xp,xq) = tanh(a
(
xTp xq
)
+ b), (3.21)
for some a > 0 and b < 0.
Also new kernels can be constructed from the old kernels using the following
properties. Given valid kernels K1(·, ·) and K2(·, ·), the following kernels will also be
valid:
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• K(xp,xq) = K1(xp,xq) +K2(xp,xq).
• K(xp,xq) = K1(xp,xq)K2(xp,xq).
• K(xp,xq) = cK1(xp,xq), where c is a constant.
• K(xp,xq) = exp(K1(xp,xq)).
• K(xp,xq) = f(K1(xp,xq)), where f(·) is a polynomial with nonnegative coeffe-
cients.
• K(xp,xq) = f(xp)K1(xp,xq)f(xq), where f(·) is any function.
3.3 Regularization and Soft Margins
Till now, we have assumed that the training data is linearly separable either in the
original input space or in some higher dimensional feature space. However in some
real-world situations, this may not be the case. The data cannot be linearly separable,
even in the higher dimensional spaces. This is due to the fact that the underlying
true class distributions, that generate the data, may have a significant overlap. In
such cases, trying to exactly separate the training data may lead to overfitting and
hence poor generalization. In such cases, we need to allow the SVM to misclassify
some of the training points for good generalization. Also sometimes, there may be
some extreme outliers in the data. The original SVM algorithm, which tries to ex-
actly separate the training data, will be extremely sensitive to such outliers. This
is clearly illustrated in the Figure 3.2. In such cases as well, we need to allow the
misclassification of some of the training points.
In case of linearly separable classes, the original SVM uses an error function that
gives an infinite error when a training sample is misclassified and zero error when
it is correctly classified, which is optimized with respect to the SVM parameters to
maximize the margin [7]. Now we can modify this error function so that the data
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity of the original SVM (with hard margin) to outliers.
points are allowed to be on the wrong side of the decision boundary with a penalty
that increases with the distance from the decision boundary. The original SVM
optimization problem (3.5) can be reformulated using L1 regularization as
min
w,b
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
n∑
i=1
ξi
s.t. yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ 1− ξi, i = 1, ..., n
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
(3.22)
where the quantities ξi, i = 1, ..., n are called slack variables. They are defined as
follows:
• For the data points that are correctly classified, and which lie on or outside the
correct side SVM margin boundary, ξi = 0.
• For the data points that are correctly classified, and which lie within the correct
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side SVM margin, 0 < ξi < 1.
• For the data points that lie exactly on the decision boundary, ξi = 1.
• For the data points that are misclassified (i.e., those which lie on the wrong side
of the decision boundary), ξi > 1.
Thus, for every data point xi that is misclassified, the objective function in (3.22)
is penalized by the quantity Cξi. Hence the parameter C > 0 controls the trade-off
between the twin objectives of maximizing the margin and minimizing the number
of data points that are allowed to be misclassified. The parameter C can also be
interpreted as analogous to a regularization parameter which controls the trade-off
between minimizing the number of classification errors and controlling the model
complexity. Thus the SVM is relaxed to include some misclassifications, which leads
to a soft margin instead of a hard margin.
As before, the dual problem of the above problem (3.22) is solved in practice. The
Lagrangian of the above problem (3.22) is
L(w, b, ξ,λ,ν) =
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
n∑
i=1
ξi −
n∑
i=1
λi(yi(w
Txi + b)− 1 + ξi)−
n∑
i=1
νiξi,
(3.23)
where λ = {λi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} and ν = {νi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} are the Lagrange
multipliers. The dual problem is given by
max
λ
D(λ) =
n∑
i=1
λi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
yiyjλiλj(xi)
Txj
s.t. 0 ≤ λi ≤ C, i = 1, ..., n
n∑
i=1
λiyi = 0.
(3.24)
The above dual problem (3.24) is similar to the earlier dual problem (3.14) with the
exception of the constraint on the Lagrange multipliers λ = {λi, i = 1, ..., n}. The
kernel trick can be applied here, and the inner product in the above dual problem is
replaced by the kernel K(xi,xj).
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3.4 Solving the SVM Dual Problem
We now describe the algorithms used to solve the SVM dual problem (3.24). The
SVM dual problem (3.24) is a quadratic programming (QP) problem, which tries to
minimize a quadratic function subject to a set of inequality and equality constraints.
Though the support vector machine (SVM) is a sparse kernel algorithm which uses
relatively few basis functions (as defined by the support vectors) to make predictions
for new data, the training/learning algorithm of the SVM uses the entire training
data. Thus, some efficient algorithms are required for solving the SVM dual problem.
The dual problem (3.24) is a quadratic programming (QP) problem. The objective
function in (3.24) is a quadratic one, which implies that any local optimal point is also
a global optimal point. Directly solving the quadratic programming (QP) problem
is often difficult and infeasible as the computational and memory requirements are
prohibitively high. The kernel matrix K ∈ Rn×n itself takes huge memory space.
When the size of the training data (n) is large, which is often the case in many real-
world applications, the SVM runs out of memory. Thus, some practical approaches
need to used in solving the SVM dual quadratic programming (QP) problem.
One such method is the chunking method [8]. In the chunking method, the actual
QP problem is broken down into a series of smaller QP problems, which identify the
non-zero Lagrange multipliers. The basic idea in this method is to scale down the
size of the kernel matrix by discarding all those elements which correspond to zero
Lagrange multipliers, and finally the scaled down QP problem is solved. Though this
method scales down the size of the problem, the computational complexity of this
method is still high for large training datasets as the method still involves several
matrix operations, and computation of gradients of the dual function. Decomposi-
tion methods [9] also try to solve a series of series of smaller QP problems. The only
difference is that each of these smaller QP problems is of a fixed size. These meth-
ods also suffer from the same disadvantages, and are not suitable for large training
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datasets.
In general, these methods are found to have computational complexity O(n3),
where n is the size of the training dataset. These methods clearly does not scale
well with the training data. For arbitrarily large training datasets, these methods
are not suitable. In the next chapter, some fast and efficient training algorithms are
presented which can be applied in applications involving very large datasets.
3.5 Summary
The support vector machine (SVM) is a maximum margin classifier which tries to
separate the data of two classes with maximum possible margin. Since the SVM gen-
erates a linear hyperplane (decision boundary), in order to generalize to nonlinearly
separable data, the kernel trick is employed to transform the input space to a high
dimensional space, where the data becomes linearly separable. Thus theoretically,
the support vector machine (SVM) has two main phases:
1. The d-dimensional original input space I is transformed into a higher dimen-
sional feature space (Hilbert space) H through a general nonlinear mapping
Φ(·). Usually, the kernel trick is used which does not require the explicit com-
putation of the nonlinear mapping Φ(·).
2. The separating hyperplane (decision boundary), with maximum possible mar-
gin, is then constructed in the high dimensional feature spaceH . This maximum
margin decision hyperplane is obtained by solving the SVM dual quadratic pro-
gramming problem.
The support vector machine (SVM), in general, generates hard classification deci-
sions for the new inputs. That is, the SVM decides whether the new input belongs to
one class or the other. The SVM does not generate probabilistic outputs. However,
in some situations, we are more interested in the probabilistic outputs instead of hard
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decisions. To address this issue, Platt proposed a post-processing approach in which a
logistic sigmoid is fitted to the outputs of an already trained support vector machine
[10]. This approach is described in detail in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 4
FAST AND EFFICIENT SVM TRAINING APPROACHES
Support vector machines (SVMs) are generally considered to be the best off-the-
shelf supervised classifiers. However, the main drawback of support vector machines
is that the training procedure has a very high computational complexity. This high
computational complexity often limits the real-time implementation of support vector
machines, especially in applications involving very large datasets like cyber attack
detection. In this chapter, we first discuss some of the existing approaches which try
to reduce the SVM training complexity, and then present our proposed fast training
approach which further reduces the SVM training complexity without significantly
degrading the classification performance of the SVM.
4.1 Existing Fast SVM Training Approaches
In [11], [12], greedy approximation of the kernel matrix and low-rank kernel repre-
sentation are proposed, respectively. The problem with these approximation-based
approaches is that they have a significant impact on the classification performance
[13]. There other approaches which try to solve the quadratic programming (QP)
problem more efficiently. One such method is the chunking method [8], which was
described in the previous chapter. As mentioned before, this method is found to
have complexity O(n3) [14], where n is the size of the training set, and hence is not
very efficient for training SVM on large datasets. Another popular approach is the
sequential minimal optimization (SMO) [14]. The sequential minimal optimization
(SMO) algorithm is basically a coordinate ascent algorithm. The SMO algorithm is a
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simpler and more efficient algorithm for solving the QP problem. The SMO basically
takes the previous chunking concept to an extreme limit. The SMO algorithm breaks
the original QP problem into a series of smaller QP subproblems. At every step,
the SMO solves a smaller optimization problem of finding the optimal values of two
Lagrange multipliers, and updates the SVM accordingly. The main advantage of the
SMO lies in the fact that solving for two Lagrange multipliers at each step is done
analytically, thus avoiding the matrix computations and standard QP calculations
on the whole. In general, the SMO method is found to have complexity O(n2) [14],
where n is the size of the training dataset. There are some other approaches which
try to avoid the quadratic program in the SVM algorithm [15]. However they still
involve the kernel trick which has the high complexity, and their performance greatly
depends on factors such as random sampling, selection of the hyperparameter values,
and stopping criteria.
On the other hand, there are improved training approaches which do not require
any type of approximation in the SVM algorithm, but rather focus on the appropriate
training data selection for SVMs [16]. In [16], a reduced SVM (RSVM) is proposed
based on a simple random sampling. Tong and Koller propose an active training
approach where the SVM learner (classifier) sequentially selects the training samples
based on certain criterion [17]. Among the proposed three methods in [17], MaxMin
and Ratio methods are computationally expensive as they tend to train the SVM
multiple times in each iteration. The Simple method, though relatively faster, is
more unstable and performed poorly on the Newsgroup data. Its complexity greatly
depends on the price of each query. Since the decision boundary of an SVM depends
only on a small subset of the training data (support vectors), fast training can be
achieved by identifying and selecting training samples that are support vectors. This
idea has been explored in [18], [19], [13], [20], [21], [22]. In [18], Abe and Inoue extract
the samples close to the boundary using the Mahalanobis distance measure, which
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generally performs well when the data belonging to each class is clustered together
and when there is a minimal overlap between the data of different classes. In [19], Shin
and Cho propose a method which selects training samples near the boundary using
the neighborhood properties of samples. Their method is based on the k-nearest
neighbor (k-NN) algorithm, and tends to be computationally expensive in case of
large high-dimensional data. Though they used a faster selective k-NN spanning
approach, the performance of their method greatly depends on k, whose value was
randomly chosen in different situations. In [13], Li et al. propose a method based
on edge detection whose performance depends on prefixed parameters including k
(in k-means clustering) and m (the number of neighbors). The method proposed by
Lyhyaoui et al. [20] also depends on some additional parameters that need to be set
beforehand. In [21], the training sample selection is done using the k-means clustering
technique. The performance of their method greatly depends on k, whose value is
randomly chosen for different cases. Fuzzy clustering based training data selection is
proposed in [22]. The proposed fuzzy clustering method works well when the exact
number of clusters in the data is known beforehand. Clearly, the performance of
most of these methods depends on certain key parameters which need to be fixed
beforehand. These methods generally perform well if the preset parameter values
exactly capture the nature of the training data. However, determining these key
parameters is generally a non-trivial task, especially in high-dimensional spaces.
4.2 A New Fast SVM Training Approach
We propose a new fast training method in which there is no need of presetting any
parameters. The basic idea is to reduce the size of the training data by retaining only
the most informative samples that are likely to become support vectors. First, we de-
tect the clusters present in the data. We use the nonparametric Bayesian approach for
clustering which does not require any preset parameters. After forming the clusters,
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we propose an efficient sample elimination approach based on logistic regression. The
proposed sample elimination approach takes two important factors into account: rel-
ative position of a sample within the cluster and the relative position of a sample with
respect to the other class data. By doing this, the SVM training complexity is shown
to be much reduced without significantly degrading the classification performance of
the SVM.
In the proposed fast training approach, our goal is to scale down the training set
by retaining only the most relevant (most informative) samples and removing the
least relevant samples. The main issue here is to determine which samples are the
most informative and which are not. It is known that the samples which are close
to the decision boundary are more important to form the boundary than the ones
which are far away. In other words, the samples which are close to the boundary
tend to be more informative for SVMs. Eventually such samples tend to become
the support vectors. We make use of this fact to design our fast training approach.
First, we accurately detect the clusters present in the training data. In each cluster,
the outward samples which are closer to the other class samples, tend to be more
informative than the inward samples. We then detect the most informative samples
in each cluster, and retain them in the training set. All the other (least informative)
samples are safely eliminated from the training set.
4.2.1 Training Data Clustering
First, we need to accurately form multiple clusters for each class present in the training
data. One way to do this is to use any existing clustering based technique to form the
clusters. However, this simple and heuristic approach may not perform well. This is
because most of the existing clustering techniques tend to form spherical clusters only.
But the true clusters in the data need not always be spherical. They can exist in any
arbitrary shape. We need to accurately model the true shapes of clusters present in
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the data, in order to accurately detect the samples which are well inside the clusters.
In this thesis, a more sophisticated method for this task is proposed.
We define a cluster, in a more general way, to be the convex hull of a set of data
points, which is the set of all convex combinations of the points. In other words, it
is the smallest convex set that contains all the points. Thus, the cluster of p points
x1,x2, ...,xp ∈ Rd is defined as
conv{x1,x2, ...,xp}
={λ1x1+λ2x2+...+λpxp | λi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., p, λ1+λ2+...+λp = 1}.
(4.1)
This is shown in Figure 4.1. In order to determine the center of a cluster, we need
to calculate the center of the convex hull. Since the convex hull of a set of points is
a polyhedron defined by its vertices, finding the exact center of this polyhedron is in
general difficult, especially in high-dimensional spaces. Hence, we approximate the
cluster (convex hull) using the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid, which is the minimum volume
ellipsoid containing the cluster. There are many nice properties of ellipsoids. They
are generally considered to be an universal geometric approximator of convex sets
as they have sufficient degrees of freedom. Furthermore, ellipsoidal approximation is
invariant under affine coordinate transformations. Finding this Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid
can be formulated as a convex optimization problem. The minimum volume ellipsoid
containing the finite set of points {x1,x2, ...,xp} is the same as the minimum volume
ellipsoid containing the polyhedron conv{x1,x2, ...,xp}. The Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid
approximating a cluster (convex hull) is shown in Figure 4.2.
Generally an ellipsoid in Rd space is defined as
E(c,P) = {x ∈ Rd|(x− c)TP−1(x− c) ≤ 1}, (4.2)
where c ∈ Rd is the center of the ellipsoid and P ∈ Rd×d is a positive definite
matrix which defines the shape and size of the ellipsoid. Using the ellipsoidal (general
33
Figure 4.1: Cluster defined as the convex hull of the data points.
Euclidean) norm ‖·‖P, the above definition is equivalent to
E(c,P) = {x ∈ Rd| ‖x− c‖P ≤ 1}, (4.3)
which represents the ellipsoid as a unit ball about the center c in the corresponding
ellipsoidal norm ‖·‖P. The volume of the ellipsoid E(c,P) is given by
vol(E(c,P)) =
√
det P
pid/2
Γ(d/2 + 1)
, (4.4)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. The volume of the ellipsoid mainly depends on
the determinant of the matrix P. Using this definition of ellipsoid, the Lo¨wner-John
ellipsoid containing the points x1,x2, ...,xp ∈ Rd can be computed by solving the
34
Figure 4.2: Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid.
following optimization problem:
minimize
√
det P
subject to (xi − c)TP−1(xi − c) ≤ 1, i = 1, ..., p
P  0,
(4.5)
where c ∈ Rd and P ∈ Rd×d are the variables. The above problem (4.5) is a nonconvex
one. To convert this into a convex problem, we need to parametrize the ellipsoid as
E(A,b) = {x ∈ Rd| ‖Ax + b‖2 ≤ 1}, (4.6)
which is the inverse image of an Euclidean unit ball under affine mapping [23]. Here
A ∈ Rd×d is a positive definite matrix, and the volume of the ellipsoid is now pro-
portional to the determinant of A−1. The new ellipsoid formulation (4.6) can always
be transformed back into the original formulation (4.2) using the following change of
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variables:
c = −A−1b,
P = A−2.
(4.7)
Using this new definition of ellipsoid, computing the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid containing
the points x1,x2, ...,xp ∈ Rd can be formulated as
minimize log det A−1
subject to ‖Axi + b‖2≤ 1, i = 1, ..., p
(4.8)
where A ∈ Rd×d and b ∈ Rd are the variables. The above problem (4.8) is a convex
optimization problem with the implicit constraint A  0. The convex optimization
problem (4.8) can be efficiently solved by the available interior-point methods.
To find the clusters present in the data, we use the nonparametric Bayesian clus-
tering method which does not require any preset sensitive parameters such as the
number of clusters. Let X = {x1, ...,xN}, xn ∈ Rd be the training data of one class.
First, we model this training data X = {x1, ...,xN}, xn ∈ Rd, by a mixture of K
Gaussian components (clusters) given by
p(xn|pi,µ,P) =
K∑
k=1
pikN (xn|µk, P−1k ),
p(X|pi,µ,P) =
N∏
n=1
p(xn) =
N∏
n=1
K∑
k=1
pikN (xn|µk, P−1k ),
(4.9)
where Pk = Σ
−1
k is the precision matrix, pik(k = 1, ..., K) are the mixing parameters
which must be positive and sum to 1.
We now introduce a latent random variable zn corresponding to each data point xn.
The variable zn can take any of the K discrete values {1, ..., K} and thus indicates the
Gaussian distribution (cluster) to which the data point xn belongs. We reformulate
the above mixture model (4.9) using these latent variables. The distribution over zn
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is given by
p(zn = k) = pik,
p(zn) =
K∏
k=1
pik
1(zn=k).
(4.10)
The conditional distribution of xn given zn is given by
p(xn|zn = k) = N (xn|µk, P−1k ),
p(xn|zn) =
K∏
k=1
N (xn|µk, P−1k )1(zn=k).
(4.11)
Calculating the marginal distribution of xn from (4.10) and (4.11) gives the original
mixture model (4.9). Considering the whole dataset X = {x1, ...,xN}, we have the
latent variables z = {z1, ..., zN}. We now have
p(z|pi) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
pik
1(zn,k), (4.12a)
p(X|z,µ,P) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
N (xn|µk, P−1k )1(zn=k). (4.12b)
For mathematical convenience, we place conjugate priors over the parameters pi,
µ and P.
p(pi) = p(pi1, ..., piK) ∼ Dirichlet
(α0
K
, ...,
α0
K
)
,
p(Pk) ∼ W(m1, V ),
p(µk) ∼ N (m2, R−1),
(4.13)
where W(m1, V ) is the Wishart distribution and {α0,m1, V,m2, R} are the hyperpa-
rameters.
The conditional posteriors for the parameters can be obtained from the priors in
(4.13) and the likelihood in (4.9). The conditional posterior for the means is given by
p(µk|X, z, Pk,m2, R) ∼ N
(
xknkPk +m2R
nkPk +R
,
1
nkPk +R
)
, (4.14)
where nk is the number of data points that belong to component (cluster) k, xk is
the mean of these points [24]. Similarly, the conditional posterior for the precisions
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is given by
p(Pk|X, z, µk,m1, V ) ∼ W
m1 + nk, (m1 + nk)
m1V + ∑
n|zn=k
(xn − µk)T (xn − µk)
−1 .
(4.15)
The mixing parameters pik(k = 1, ..., K) have the symmetric Dirichlet prior with
parameter α0/K.
p(pi) = p(pi1, ..., piK) ∼ Dirichlet
(α0
K
, ...,
α0
K
)
=
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0/K)K
K∏
k=1
pi
α0/(K−1)
k . (4.16)
Given the mixing parameters pik(k = 1, ..., K), the latent variables z have the multi-
nomial distribution.
p(z|pi) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
pik
1(zn=k),
p(z|pi) =
K∏
k=1
pik
nk , nk =
N∑
n=1
1(zn = k).
(4.17)
Integrating out the mixing parameters using the Dirichlet integral, we get the prior
on z directly as
p(z) = p(z|α0) = Γ(α0)
Γ(N + α0)
K∏
k=1
Γ(nk + α0/K)
Γ(α0/K)
. (4.18)
Writing the conditional prior (suitable for Gibbs sampling), we have
P (zn = k|z−n, α0) = n−n,k + α0/K
N − 1 + α0 ,
(4.19)
where subscript −n denotes all indices except n and n−n,k is the number of data
points (excluding xn) associated with the component (cluster) k. As we do not know
the number of clusters (K) beforehand, we take the limit K →∞ on the conditional
prior in (4.19). This yields the following conditional prior:
P (zn = k|z−n, α0) = n−n,k
N − 1 + α0 ,
(4.20a)
P (zn 6= zm∀m ∈ {−n}|z−n, α0) = α0
N − 1 + α0 .
(4.20b)
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This conditional prior is often interpreted as the Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP).
From the Bayes’ theorem, the posterior of the latent variables z is given by
p(z|X) ∝ p(X|z)p(z). (4.21)
From the conditional priors in (4.20a)-(4.20b) and the likelihood in (4.12b), we get
the conditional posteriors for the latent variables z:
P (zn = k|z−n,xn, α0, µk, Pk) ∝ n−n,k
N − 1 + α0N (xn|µk, P
−1
k ), (4.22a)
P (zn 6= zm∀m ∈ {−n}|z−n,xn, α0,m1, V,m2, R)
∝ α0
N − 1 + α0
∫
p(xn|µk, Pk)p(µk, Pk|m1, V,m2, R)dµkdPk,
∝ α0
N − 1 + α0
∫
N (xn|µk, P−1k )p(µk|m2, R)p(Pk|m1, V )dµkdPk.
(4.22b)
We use a Gibbs sampling method [25] and repeatedly sample from the posterior
(4.22a)-(4.22b):
• For all k, sample µk and Pk according to the equations (4.14)-(4.15). Calculate
the RHS of (4.22a).
• Draw 50 samples of µk and Pk from their priors in (4.13) to approximately
calculate the integral on the RHS of (4.22b). And then calculate the RHS of
(4.22b).
• Draw a sample for z from the multinomial distribution with the above calculated
event probabilities.
• Remove a component (cluster) when it becomes empty. A new component
(cluster) is added when a new unrepresented component from (4.22b) is chosen.
• We initially start with a single cluster and preset hyperparameters.
• Stopping criterion: Stop when the components are neither removed nor added
for five consecutive iterations.
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The convergence and the accuracy of the above sampling method depends mainly
on the hyperparameter α0. If α0 is too low, we may get less number clusters. On the
other hand, if it is too high, we may get more number of clusters. We empirically
set α0 =
N
100
. The remaining hyperparameters are set according to the hyperpriors
suggested in [24] 1. After the convergence, the components obtained are considered
to be the clusters present in the data. The Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid for each cluster is
then calculated by (4.8). This clustering process is done for the data of each class
separately.
4.2.2 Training Data Elimination
With the above clustering algorithm, every cluster in the training data is accurately
modeled by its Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid. We now make use of the fact that the samples
which are close to the decision boundary are more informative than the ones which
are far away. The relative informativeness of a sample is determined by the following
two factors:
1. Relative position of the sample in the cluster.
2. Relative position of the sample with respect to the other class data.
In other words, the samples which are well inside the clusters and far away from the
other class data are considered to be least informative and hence can be eliminated.
All such samples which are considered to be least informative among each cluster
are eliminated from the training set. Only the most informative samples stay in the
training set. The probability that a sample xn stays in the training set is given by a
1The presetting of these parameters has minimal effect on the final SVM classification perfor-
mance.
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logistic regression model:
Pstay(xn) =
eG
1 + eG
,
where
G = α1(2v1 − 1) + α2(2v2 − 1),
v1 = ‖xn − c‖P ,
v2 =
∥∥∥∑kothj=1 zij∥∥∥
‖zmax‖ ,
(4.23)
where α1 and α2 are the parameters of the logistic regression model, c and ‖·‖P are
respectively the center and the ellipsoidal norm of the cluster to which the sample
xn belongs, koth is the number of other class clusters, zij is the force vector which
represents the closeness of the sample xn to the other class cluster j, zmax is the
maximum force vector of all the samples within the cluster to which the sample xn
belongs. The force vector between the sample xn and the cluster j is given by
zij =
cj − xn
‖cj − xn‖22
, (4.24)
where cj is the center of the cluster j. The numerator of v2 gives the magnitude of
the resultant force between the sample xi and the other class cluster centers, and
the denominator is a normalization factor. Infact the indepenent variables v1 and v2
in the logistic model are measures of the aforementioned factors. The above defined
variables vary in the interval [0,1]. So the logistic model using the above variables
directly will not span the entire probability space of [0,1]. Hence we first apply the
affine transformation (·) 7→ 2(·)− 1 to the variables.
The logistic model parameters are empirically chosen to be α1 = 10 and α2 = 20.
The values of these parameters govern the final probability of stay (Pstay) values. As
we intend to make hard decisions about the sample selection, the probability of stay
(Pstay) values need to be either 0 or 1. Hence, relatively higher values were given to
the parameters. The corresponding sigmoid curve is shown in Figure 4.3. The values
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of these parameters can be adjusted to make the sigmoid curve more smoother, and
more probabilistic decisions can be made about the sample selection as required.
Also, we gave relatively more importance to the second variable v2 which measures
the closeness of the sample to the other class data. We retain all the training samples
whose probability of stay (Pstay) is equal to 1. All the other samples are eliminated
from the training set. Finally the support vector machine is trained using this new
training set which contains only the most informative training samples.
Figure 4.3: Logistic sigmoid curve of the training sample elimination model.
4.3 Complexity and Performance Analysis
Computing the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid is the key to the proposed training sample
selection method. The Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid for each cluster in the data is computed
by solving the convex optimization problem (4.8). The problem (4.8) is a second-order
cone programming (SOCP) problem which can be efficiently solved using the available
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interior-point methods. In this work, we have used the self-dual minimization method
whose complexity is about O(
√
dp), where p is the number of points and d is the
dimension [26]. However, the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid is usually determined by at most
d2+3d
2
points out of the p points [27]. Thus, the complexity of computing the Lo¨wner-
John ellipsoid can be further reduced by intelligently selecting these points. For this
purpose, we use the active-set strategy based on Sample Covariance Initialization
(SCI) proposed by [28]:
1. Define an initial active set X0a = {x1, ...,xL} such that the affine hull of x1, ...,xL
spans the space Rd. The Sample Covariance Initialization (SCI) scheme in [28]
is used.
2. (ith iteration) Solve (4.8) for the active set Xia. Let (c
i,Pi) be the solution.
3. If din = ‖xn − ci‖Pi ≤ 1 for n ∈ X\Xia, stop. Otherwise, proceed to the next
step.
4. Update the active set to Xi+1a :
• (Adding points to the active set) Xi+1a = Xia ∪∆Xa. We intend to add the
points xn /∈ Xia whose distance from current center ci in the ellipsoidal
norm ‖·‖Pi (din) ≥ 1 and largest. To further reduce the redundancy, we
intend to add the points that are well spread around the current ellip-
soid E(ci,Pi). For this purpose, we gradually consider the points in the
descending order of din, and add a point xn to ∆Xa if
∑
j∈∆Xa (xn − ci)TP i
−1
(xj − ci) < 0. (4.25)
• (Removing the points that are no longer necessary) We delete all the points
xn whose d
i
n < 0.99.
Go to step 2.
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Using this active-set strategy, the complexity in computing the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid
is greatly reduced.
For the analysis purpose, the proposed fast training method is divided into the
following four phases where most of the computation happens:
1. Clustering the data.
2. Computing the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoids for each cluster.
3. Training sample elimination.
4. Training the SVM using the new training set.
For the nonparametric Bayesian clustering approach, we first evaluate the complexity
of each iteration. The total amount of computation involved in each iteration can be
typically divided into the following parts:
• Sampling the mean vectors and precision matrices from normal and Wishart
distributions respectively.
• Calculating the posterior probabilities for each sample.
• Sampling the latent variables z from the multinomial distribution.
The complexity of sampling from normal and Wishart distributions is on the order of
O(d), where d is the dimension of the data. The complexity of calculating the posterior
probabilities for n samples is O(n). The complexity of sampling the latent variables
from multinomial distribution is O(n). Thus the complexity of each iteration in the
nonparametric Bayesian clustering is O(n). Generally, the total number of iterations
is much smaller than the size of the training data. Thus, the overall complexity of
the nonparametric Bayesian clustering approach can be approximated to O(n). After
clustering, computing the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoids for the clusters has the complexity
O(n) at most. The sample elimination approach involves calculating the probability
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of stay for each sample, and hence has the complexity O(n). After reducing the
training set to m (m  n) training samples, the SVM is trained using this new
training set. The complexity of this phase is O(m2), as we use the SMO method.
Thus the total complexity of our SVM training algorithm is at most
O(n) +O(n) +O(n) +O(m2), (4.26)
whereas the complexity of conventional SVM training (using the SMO method) is
O(n2). With m  n, this clearly demonstrates the reduction in the computational
complexity achieved by using the proposed fast training approach.
Our main objective in designing the fast training approach is to decrease the
computational complexity of SVM training without having huge degradation in the
classification performance of the SVM. This is clearly taken care of in the design of
our fast training approach, where we retain only the most relevant samples that are
likely to become support vectors, thus greatly reducing the size of the training set
and the SVM training complexity.
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CHAPTER 5
FUSION RULES BASED ON DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
In this chapter, we present the data fusion rules which are used at each sensor and
the fusion center of the proposed cyber attack detection system. The fusion rules are
designed using the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. The Dempster-Shafer theory
can be considered as a generalized version of the traditional probability theory. The
Dempster-Shafer theory is a result of the work by Arthur P. Dempster [29] and Glenn
Shafer [30].
The Dempster-Shafer theory is both a theory of evidence and a theory of probable
reasoning. It exactly quantifies the amount of evidence available from a source. Also,
the Dempster-Shafer theory effectively combines evidence from different sources and
defines the degree of belief based on the total evidence available from different sources.
Probability theory is the most widely used mathematical framework to represent
uncertainty. Generally, uncertainty can be of two types:
1. Aleatoric Uncertainty (Objective or Stochastic Uncertainty): It is the
uncertainty due to the random behavior of a system. This type of uncertainty
can be described using the idea of chances in general.
2. Epistemic Uncertainty (Subjective Uncertainty): It is the uncertainty
due to the lack of information or knowledge about a system. In other words,
it is the uncertainty due to ignorance. Generally, it can be described using the
idea of beliefs.
The traditional probability theory is based on the theory of chance, which is generally
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used to describe the aleatoric uncertainties. The probability theory, when applied in
aleatoric situations, is generally referred to as the objective (or frequency) probability
theory. Hence, the traditional probability theory can handle the aleatoric uncertainty
very well. However, the traditional probability theory has been directly extended to
characterize the epistemic uncertainty as well (through the Bayesian theory). In
the Bayesian theory of probability, the probability is defined and interpreted as the
degree of belief in a particular proposition (or hypothesis) on the basis of the available
evidence. Thus, the probability P (A) represents the degree of belief in the proposition
A based on the available evidence. And the probability distribution (probability
density function or probability mass function) is used to represent the amount of
available evidence.
The (Bayesian) probability theory cannot accurately characterize the epistemic
uncertainty. The basic idea in the Bayesian theory that the degrees of belief always
tend to be like the objective probabilities (chances) in their mathematical structure,
is not true in general. The degrees of belief do not, in general, have the same mathe-
matical properties of objective probabilities (chances). However, the Bayesian theory
explicitly forces that the degrees of belief (represented by the Bayesian probabilities)
must obey all the mathematical rules of the chances (objective probabilities). The
Bayesian theory directly adopts the three basic axioms of (objective) probability to
the Bayesian probability (which are the degrees of belief in the Bayesian theory). This
makes the Bayesian theory too restrictive and less flexible in modeling epistemic un-
certainty (or ignorance). The mathematical rule that makes the Bayesian probability
theory too restrictive is the third axiom of probability:
• Additivity axiom of probability: The probability of the union of mutually
exclusive (disjoint) events must be equal to the sum of the probabilities of the
individual events. Let E1, E2, ..., EN be the mutually exclusive events of the
sample space Ω. Then, according to the additivity axiom of the probability
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theory,
P (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ EN) = P (E1) + P (E2) + ...+ P (EN) =
N∑
i=1
P (Ei). (5.1)
This rule is not appropriate for modeling the epistemic uncertainty. Due to this
assumption, the Bayesian probability theory cannot exactly represent the ignorance.
For example, let E ∈ Ω represent a proposition and the complement E ∈ Ω represent
the negation of the proposition. Since E ∪ E = Ω, from the above rule of additivity,
the Bayesian probabilities which represent the degrees of belief must satisfy condition:
P (E) + P (E) = 1. This implies that the P (E) cannot be low unless the P (E) is
sufficiently high. Thus, the main difficulty of the Bayesian probability theory is that
it cannot distinguish between the lack of belief and disbelief. The Bayesian probability
theory does not allow to withhold belief from a hypothesis without giving it to the
negation of the hypothesis. This leads to the Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason
in the Bayesian theory, which restricts that the complete ignorance is always modeled
by the uniform probability distribution. Hence the (Bayesian) probability theory
cannot accurately characterize the epistemic uncertainty. A more general and flexible
mathematical framework is required to accurately model the epistemic uncertainty
(or ignorance).
The Dempster-Shafer theory is a more generalized mathematical framework that
can be applied to accurately characterize the epistemic uncertainty. In a finite dis-
crete space, the Dempster-Shafer theory can be considered as a generalization of
the probability theory, where the degree of beliefs (represented by probabilities in
the probability theory) are assigned to sets of events besides individual events. The
(Bayesian) probability theory is a special case of the Dempster-Shafer theory. The
greater flexibility of the Dempster-Shafer theory is valuable and essential for an ade-
quate representation of evidence and probable reasoning [30].
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5.1 Basics of Dempster-Shafer Theory
Let Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θN} be the set of all possible hypotheses (or propositions). The
set Θ is called the frame of discernment. Let 2Θ be the power set of Θ, i.e., the set of
all possible subsets of Θ. A real function m : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] is called a basic probability
assignment (BPA) if
m(∅) = 0,
and
∑
A∈2Θ
m(A) = 1.
(5.2)
The basic probability assignment (BPA) function is sometimes referred to as the mass
function. The quantity m(A) is called the basic probability number of A (or sometimes
called the mass number).
The basic probability number of A can be interpreted as the measure of belief
that is committed exactly to A. The above conditions reflect the facts that no belief
should be committed to the empty set ∅ and the total belief must be equal to 1.
For a given set A, the basic probability number m(A) represents belief that the true
hypothesis lies in the set A. In other words, m(A) represents the proportion of the
total available evidence that supports the claim that the true hypothesis lies in the
set A but not in any particular subset of A. Thus in other words, the BPA m(·) is
a measure of evidence. For singletons A = {θi}, the basic probability number m(A)
represents our confidence that the hypothesis θi is true. For non-singletons A 6= {θi},
the basic probability number m(A) represents our ignorance, as we are not exactly
sure which hypothesis in the set A is actually true. The important thing to note is
that the basic probability number m(A) makes claims only about the set A. It does
not make any additional claims about the subsets of A. Any additional evidence or
information about the subsets of A should be represented by another BPA function.
For a given set A, m(A) +m(A) ≤ 1, where A is the complement of A. When the
inequality holds, the amount of belief assigned neither to A nor to A represents the
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degree of ignorance. In general, the BPA m(·) is not same as the classical probability.
However in some special cases, the BPA m(·) can be equivalent to the classical prob-
ability. For example, for a given frame of discernment Θ, m(A) 6= 0 for all A = {θi}
and m(A) = 0 for all A 6= {θi}, the BPA m(·) is equivalent to the classical probability.
Given a BPA m(·), a real function Bel : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] called a belief function is
defined as follows:
Belief of a set B, Bel(B) =
∑
A⊆B
m(A). (5.3)
The belief of a set B is defined as the sum of the basic probability numbers of all the
subsets of B. Thus, the belief function Bel(·) represents the total belief that is com-
mitted to a particular hypothesis (or proposition). The BPA function m(·) represents
the belief that is committed to a particular hypothesis (or proposition), not the total
belief. The BPA m(·) can be considered as a generalization of the probability distri-
bution (probability density function or probability mass function), whereas the belief
function Bel(·) can be considered as a generalization of the probability function. For
singletons A = {θi}, Bel(A) = m(A). Given a subset A of the frame of discernment
Θ, it is called a focal element of a belief function if m(A) > 0. The union of all the
focal elements of a belief function is called the core of the belief function.
Given a BPA m(·), a real function Pl : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] called a plausibility function is
defined as follows:
Plausibility of a set B, Pl(B) =
∑
A∩B 6=∅
m(A). (5.4)
The plausibility of a set B is defined as the sum of all the basic probability numbers
of the sets that intersect B. The plausibility function can be defined using the belief
function as follows:
Plausibility of a set B, Pl(B) = 1−Bel(B), (5.5)
where B is the complement of B. This clearly implies that the amount of belief not
assigned to B is not automatically assigned to B, like in the probability theory. This
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belief (not assigned to B) makes B more probable or plausible and is represented by
the plausibility of B, Pl(B).
The Dempster-Shafer framework uses these two measures, belief Bel(·) and plau-
sibility Pl(·), to deal with the epistemic uncertainty. These two measures, belief
Bel(·) and plausibility Pl(·), generally form the lower and upper bounds of the clas-
sical probability measure. That is, the classical probability of an event lies within the
lower and upper bounds of belief and plausibility. Given a set A,
Bel(A) ≤ P (A) ≤ Pl(A). (5.6)
For this reason, the belief and the plausibility values are sometimes called the lower
and upper probabilities.
5.2 Dempster’s Rule of Combination
Another main advantage in the Dempster-Shafer theory is the ability to combine the
evidences from difference sources using the Dempster’s rule of combination. Demp-
ster’s rule of combination provides a way for effectively changing our (prior) beliefs
in the light of new evidence. The Dempster’s rule of combination deals symmetri-
cally with the new and the old evidence, unlike the Bayesian theory which represents
the new evidence as a proposition and conditions the prior (Bayesian) belief on that
proposition using the Bayes’ rule of conditioning. There is no symmetry in dealing
the new and the old evidence in the Bayesian theory. Also in the Bayesian theory,
when combining new and old evidence, an assumption that the new evidence always
establishes a single proposition with certainty is made. This further restricts the
Bayesian theory in effectively combining different evidences. On the other hand, the
Dempster’s rule of combination in the Dempster-Shafer theory treats both the new
and the old evidence equally, and provides a method to effectively combine them
without making any restrictive assumptions.
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Let m1(·) and m2(·) be the two basic probability assignments (BPAs) on the
frame of discernment Θ corresponding to two independent sources of evidence. Then
from the Dempster’s rule of combination, we can fuse those two basic probability
assignments (BPAs) into a single new BPA m12(·) as
m12 = m1 ⊕m2,
m12(A) =
∑
B∩C=Am1(B)m2(C)
1−∑B∩C=∅m1(B)m2(C) .
(5.7)
The operator ⊕ represents the orthogonal sum.
The Dempster’s rule of combination is illustrated geometrically in the following
figures. Let m1(·) be the basic probability assignment (BPA) over a frame of discern-
ment Θ, and m2(·) be another independent basic probability assignment (BPA) over
the same frame of discernment Θ. Let A1, ..., Ak be the focal elements of m1(·) and
B1, ..., Bl be the focal elements of m2(·). The corresponding BPA values of these focal
elements can be depicted as segments of the line segment from 0 to 1, as shown in
Figure 5.1. Figure 5.2 shows the unit square obtained by orthogonally combining the
individual line segments m1 and m2. The unit square represents the total basic proba-
bility mass. The BPA m1(·) commits the vertical stripes to its focal elements, and the
BPA m2(·) commits the horizontal stripes to its focal elements. Now the Figure 5.2
shows the total combined belief (the shaded rectangle) that is committed exactly to
Ai ∩Bj, which is given by the quantity m1(Ai)m2(Bj). Similarly the total combined
belief of every rectangle in the Figure 5.2 can be calculated. Now a set A in general
may have one or more than one of these rectangles in it, and hence the total combined
probability mass that is exactly committed to A is given by
∑
B∩C=Am1(B)m2(C).
Since some of the rectangles in the unit square may always lie in the empty set ∅,
some belief is always assigned to the empty set ∅. In order to avoid this, all such
rectangles are discarded and the basic probability masses of the remaining rectangles
need to be increased by the factor
(
1−∑B∩C=∅m1(B)m2(C))−1, so that the total
probability mass will be equal to 1.
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Figure 5.1: Basic probability assignments (BPAs) of two independent sources of evi-
dence.
The Dempster’s rule of combination (5.7) can be generalized to combine the basic
probability assignments (BPAs) from multiple independent sources of evidence.
m = m1 ⊕m2 ⊕ ...⊕mL. (5.8)
5.3 Local Fusion Rule at Each Sensor
At each sensor, we have a binary classifier (SVM) trained for each class. For the ith
SVM gi(·) at a sensor, which decides whether a sample x belongs to class i or not, the
output of the SVM is y = sgn(fi(x)), where fi(x) is the corresponding SVM decision
function. Clearly this SVM function fi(x) is evidence available at the ith SVM gi(·).
Hence the BPA function can be defined based on this SVM function.
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Figure 5.2: Dempster’s rule of combination of basic probability assignments (BPAs)
of two independent sources of evidence.
The BPA function mi(·) for the ith SVM gi(·) is defined as:
mi(A)

= P (y = 1|fi(x)) = Pi, if A = {θi}
= 1− P (y = 1|fi(x)) = 1− Pi, if A = Θ\{θi}
= 0, otherwise
(5.9)
where Pi = P (y = 1|fi(x)) is the posterior probability of class i given the ith SVM
output function fi(x). This probability represents the total amount of evidence that
supports the hypothesis θi (sample x belongs to class i). All the remaining evidence
does not support any other hypothesis in particular, and hence is assigned to all the
remaining hypotheses Θ\{θi}. The posterior probability P (y = 1|fi(x)) for support
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vector machines can be calculated in different ways. One such method of calculating
the posterior probabilities is presented in Appendix A.
After calculating the posterior probabilities P (y = 1|fi(x)), the BPAs correspond-
ing to the different SVMs at each sensor can be fused using the Dempster’s rule of
combination (5.8). The new combined BPA at each sensor m(·) is
m(A)

= (1−P1)(1−P2)...(1−Pi−1)Pi(1−Pi+1)...(1−PL)
R
, if A = {θi}
= 0, otherwise
(5.10)
where i = 1, ..., L and R is a normalization factor which satisfies the condition∑
A∈2Θ m(A) = 1. Based on this new BPA m(·), the belief function Bel(·) at each
sensor can be defined as
Bel(A) =
(1− P1)(1− P2)...(1− Pi−1)Pi(1− Pi+1)...(1− PL)
R
, if A = {θi} (5.11)
where i = 1, ..., L. For singletons, the belief function is same as the BPA.
Finally at each sensor, a sample x is classified into the class with the highest
belief. The local decision at sensor Sj is given by
uj = arg max
i=1,...,L
Bel({θi}). (5.12)
Clearly from (5.11), for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ L, we have Bel({θi}) ≥ Bel({θj}) iff Pi ≥ Pj.
Hence the local decision at sensor Sj is given by
uj = arg max
i=1,...,L
Bel({θi}) = arg max
i=1,...,L
Pi. (5.13)
5.4 Global Fusion Rule at the Fusion Center
Each sensor transmits its local decision uj and the corresponding posterior probability
Pi to the fusion center. Based on the available local decisions, the fusion center takes
the final (global) decision regarding the state of the network. The fusion center takes
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the final decision u0 using the majority voting rule. The final decision u0 at the fusion
center, given all the local decisions {uj, j = 1, ...,M}, is given by
u0 = ul,
where
l = arg max
j=1,...,M
M∑
i=1
1(uj = ui), and i 6= j,
(5.14)
and 1(H) = 1 when condition H is true and 1(H) = 0 when condition H is false.
In case of tie between the sensors, the final decision is made based on the corre-
sponding posterior probability value. This posterior probability value plays the role
of a confidence score of the corresponding local decision. In case of tie between the
sensors, the final decision u0 at the fusion center is given by
u0 = ul,
where
l = arg max
j
Pj,
(5.15)
and Pj is the posterior probability corresponding to the local decision uj.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter, the proposed distributed cyber attack detection system is evaluated
on the widely used 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset [31]. The results of both
the training phase and the decision making phase are presented.
6.1 Cyber Attacks Dataset
The 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset [31] is the popular publicly available cyber
attacks dataset. The 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset is a version of the 1998
DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program data, which is developed by MIT
Lincoln Laboratory. In the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program by
the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, the normal and attack data was recreated on a private
network using real hosts, live attacks, and live background traffic.
The testbed used by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory is shown in Figure 6.1 [32]. The
testbed simulates network traffic similar to the one seen between a Air Force base
and the Internet. Custom software is used to simulate hundreds of different types
of users like programmers, managers, workers, system administrators, attackers, etc.,
running the common UNIX applications. The user operations include typical day-
to-day operations like sending and receiving email, browsing the Web, sending and
receiving files using FTP, remote logging in using Telnet to work, chatting using
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), etc. The custom software also allows the small number
of hosts present to appear as thousands of hosts with different IP addresses. Large
amount of network traffic is generated using different network services and protocols.
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The total proportion and variability in the generated network traffic are similar to
that of a typical Air Force base. All the attacks are launched from the outside of the
simulated Air Force base.
Figure 6.1: The 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation testbed.
In Figure 6.2 [32], a more detailed block diagram of the testbed is shown. The
simulated Air Force base contains three UNIX machines (Linux 2.0.27, SunOS 4.1.4,
Sun Solaris 2.5.1) which are the frequent victims of the attacks, and a gateway to
hundreds of other computers and workstations. The outside part shown in the figure
contains several workstations and Web servers, which simulate the Internet. A sniffer
is used to capture the traffic. The total data used in the evaluation program is
collected from the following three sources:
1. Network sniffing data from the sniffer.
2. Sun Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM) audit data from the Solaris host.
3. Disk dump data from the three UNIX victim machines.
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Figure 6.2: Detailed block diagram of the 1998 DARPA evaluation testbed.
A large amount of background traffic is generated between the inside PCs and
workstations and the outside workstations and Web servers. A lot of user operations
are performed on the three victim machines inside from the outside using various net-
work protocols like Telnet. The three gateway machines used contain some operating
system kernel modifications, which together with the custom software allows the small
number of hosts present to appear as thousands of hosts with different IP addresses.
The contents of the network traffic for some services like SMTP, FTP, and HTTP
are ensured to be statistically similar to that of a live network traffic. For instance,
the email message contents are created using the statistical bigrams frequencies pre-
serving the one-word and two-word sequence statistics from a sample of 10,000 actual
email messages from different computer professionals, which are initially filtered using
a 40,000 word dictionary to remove names and other sensitive private information.
Some of other email messages are the actual messages which are taken from a variety
of public domain mail list servers. The FTP file transfers content is also generated
using the similar approaches.
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The content of the web servers is generated using a custom web automaton run
on the real Internet. The custom web automaton used is initially programmed to
visit several thousands of websites with a frequency proportional to the website’s
popularity, and to visit some random number of links at each website before moving
to another website. Thus, it generated a large database of public domain website
content, which is then used in the testbed. As the testbed is not connected to the
Internet for security reasons, this automaton process ensures that the outside part
of the testbed simulates the real Internet. During the experiments, the browsing
automata accessed different web pages on the web servers through the outside web
gateway. Again, custom software is used in the outside web gateway to emulate
thousands of websites. Also, custom software is used to generate user automata which
simulates some simple scenarios like the one in which there are different users typing
at the keyboards. Actual humans performed more complex tasks like upgrading
the software, changing passwords, remotely accessing the programs, some system
administration tasks, sending and receiving email, etc.
A total of 32 different cyber attacks were generated in the evaluation program.
All the attacks fall into the following four categories:
1. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
2. Remote to Local (R2L) attacks
3. User to Root (U2R) attacks
4. Probe attacks
The generation of the attacks is a complex process. First the attack mechanism was
studied and analyzed, and then a working attack is developed on the testbed. The
working attack developed is further analyzed and tuned to determine the software
and/or services required to run the attack. This analysis is also used to develop
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new stealthy versions of the attack. Novel attacks were generated using the network
weaknesses in the developed testbed. The novel (unseen) attacks were used only in
the test data, to facilitate the evaluation of the cyber attack detection system’s ability
in detecting the new never-before-seen attacks.
A total of nine weeks of raw data is collected and used as the training data.
The raw training data was about 4 GB of compressed binary TCP dump data of
network traffic. This raw data is finally processed into five million connection records.
Similarly, two weeks of data is collected and used as the test data. The final processed
test data contains around two million connection records. A connection is defined as
“a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between
which data flows to and from a source IP address to a target IP address under some
well defined protocol.” [31] Each connection is labeled as either normal, or as an
attack, with exactly one specific attack type. Each connection record is about 100
bytes in size.
The 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset [31] is a version of this 1998 DARPA
Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program data. Each record (connection record) in
the KDD dataset has 41 features. All the features come from three different sources
(or sensors). All the 41 features are divided into three different groups corresponding
to each sensor. The different types of cyber attacks in the KDD dataset are listed in
the Table 6.1. The first column (Old) lists all the attack types that are present in
the training data. The second column (New) list all the new (novel) attacks that are
present only in the test data but not in the training data. All the attacks are grouped
into the four general cyber attack categories. We evaluate the proposed distributed
cyber attack detection system on this KDD dataset. However recently, a statistical
analysis of the KDD dataset exposed some issues with the original KDD dataset,
which highly affects the performance of the evaluated systems [33]. The main issues
found were:
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• A number of duplicate records are present in the test dataset, which makes the
evaluation biased towards some detection systems.
• The training set includes huge number of redundant records of some attack
types.
To eliminate these issues, a new dataset NSL-KDD is proposed [33]. The NSL-KDD
dataset consists of selected records of the entire KDD dataset and does not suffer from
the above mentioned problems. We evaluated the proposed cyber attack detection
system on this NSL-KDD dataset.
The NSL-KDD dataset contains 125,973 records in the training set, and 22,544
records in the test set. Initially 10% of the training set is set aside as the validation set,
and the remaining data is used for training the classifiers (support vector machines).
6.2 Training Phase
As mentioned before, we have a total of three sensors. As we try to classify the cyber
attacks into the four general categories (DoS, R2L, U2R, and Probe), we have a total
of five classes including the normal class. Thus the proposed cyber attack detection
system has a total of fifteen binary classifiers (support vector machines), with five
binary classifiers at each sensor. In the training phase, all the binary classifiers (sup-
port vector machines) under all the sensors are trained on the training set. Support
vector machines with the Gaussian kernel are used. The Gaussian kernel function is
given by
K(xp,xq) = exp
(
−‖xp − xq‖
2
2σ2
)
. (6.1)
The Gaussian kernel (6.1) corresponds to an infinite dimensional feature mapping.
Hence the resulting feature space is a Hilbert space of infinite dimensions.
The support vector machine finally has two parameters which need to be preset:
the regularization parameter C and the Gaussian kernel parameter σ. The choice of
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these parameters really depends on the problem at hand and the corresponding data.
In order to pick the best parameter values for each support vector machine, we adopt
a model selection approach. We adopt the simple and effective grid-search using
cross-validation. Several pairs of the parameters (C, σ) are used and the one with the
best cross-validation accuracy is finally picked for the support vector machine. The
grid-search is done using the following values of C and σ:
• C = 0.125, 0.5, 2, 8, 32, 128, 512.
• σ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16.
Generally this grid-search based model selection is time consuming. But with our
proposed fast training approach, this is not a problem as the model selection is done
using the new training set which contains relatively few samples. This further high-
lights the advantage of the proposed fast training approach.
All the 15 support vector machines are trained on the training set using the
proposed fast training approach. For comparison, the support vector machines were
also trained in the normal way (i.e., by using the entire training set). The total
training time for all the 15 support vector machines using both the approaches is
given in Table 6.2. From the table, it is clear that the proposed fast SVM training
approach greatly reduces the computational complexity of training the support vector
machines (SVMs).
6.3 Decision Making Phase
Once all the binary classifiers (support vector machines) are trained, the posterior
class probabilities need to be estimated. As mentioned before, this is done as ex-
plained in the Appendix A. As suggested, the unused part of the training set and the
validation set are used to fit the sigmoid. The Newton’s method with backtracking
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line search is used for solving the unconstrained optimization problem. This is done
for all of the support vector machines (SVMs).
After obtaining the posterior probability model for each SVM, the local and the
final decisions are made using the proposed fusion rules. The following tables show
the final confusion matrices on the NSL-KDD test set. Table 6.3 shows the confusion
matrix of the proposed distributed cyber attack detection system on the NSL-KDD
test set (using only the old attack types). Table 6.4 shows the confusion matrix of
the proposed distributed cyber attack detection system, using the SVMs which are
trained normally using the entire training set, on the NSL-KDD test set (using only
the old attack types). From the tables, it is clear that the proposed cyber attack
detection system (with the SVMs trained using the proposed fast training approach)
is more effective in detecting the cyber attacks than the system (with the SVMs
trained normally). This is due to the fact that in the case of SVMs trained using
the proposed fast training approach, more training data is available to fit the sigmoid
of the SVM posterior probability model, as only a subset of the whole training data
is used to actually train the SVMs. All the remaining training data along with the
validation data is available for fitting the sigmoid of the SVM posterior probability
model. Whereas in the case of SVMs trained normally, all the training data is used
for training the SVMs, and only the validation data is left for fitting the sigmoid of
the SVM posterior probability model. This results in the poor posterior probability
models for the SVMs which are trained normally. Thus, the proposed fast SVM
training approach efficiently uses the available training data.
Also the proposed cyber attack detection system is evaluated on the NSL-KDD
test set using the old as well as the new attacks. The Table 6.5 shows the confusion
matrix of the proposed cyber attack detection system on the NSL-KDD test set
containing both old and new (novel) attacks. From the table, it is clear that the
proposed cyber attack detection system performs well on detecting the novel attacks.
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Actually, the proposed cyber attack detection system can detect all the new attacks
which are statistically similar or close to the old attacks. The proposed system cannot
accurately detect the new attacks which are completely different from the old attacks.
The detection accuracies for R2L and U2R attacks are very low when compared
to others, because of the less training data available for these types of attacks. The
R2L and U2R cyber attacks occur rarely in general. So, we have less training data
available for them.
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Table 6.1: Types of cyber attacks in the 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset.
Attack Old New
Category
Denial of Service (DoS) back udp storm
land process table
neptune mailbomb
pod apache2
smurf
teardrop
7 write
Remote to Local (R2L) ftp write snmpgetattack
guess password sendmail
imap xlock
multihop xsnoop
phf httptunnel
spy named
warezclient
warezmaster
User to Root (U2R) buffer overflow sqlattack
loadmodule xterm
perl snmpguess
rootkit worm
ps
Probe ip sweep saint
nmap mscan
port sweep
satan
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Table 6.2: Total training time for the support vector machines.
SVM Training Time Training Time
using the proposed using the normal
fast training approach training approach
(in min.) (in min.)
SVM (Normal, Sensor 1) 69 108
SVM (DoS, Sensor 1) 66 112
SVM (R2L, Sensor 1) 36 56
SVM (U2R, Sensor 1) 28 49
SVM (Probe, Sensor 1) 51 89
SVM (Normal, Sensor 2) 61 105
SVM (DoS, Sensor 2) 58 104
SVM (R2L, Sensor 2) 35 62
SVM (U2R, Sensor 2) 24 46
SVM (Probe, Sensor 2) 45 87
SVM (Normal, Sensor 3) 56 106
SVM (DoS, Sensor 3) 49 99
SVM (R2L, Sensor 3) 31 51
SVM (U2R, Sensor 3) 20 38
SVM (Probe, Sensor 3) 41 79
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Table 6.3: Confusion matrix of the proposed cyber attack detection system on the
NSL-KDD test set (with only old attacks).
Predicted → Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Correct Detection
Actual ↓ Rate
Normal 9430 88 41 26 126 97.11%
DoS 119 5441 22 19 140 94.77%
R2L 852 147 796 15 389 36.20%
U2R 8 3 2 19 5 51.35%
Probe 106 19 27 12 942 85.17%
Table 6.4: Confusion matrix of the proposed cyber attack detection system (using
SVMs which are trained normally) on the NSL-KDD test set (with only old attacks).
Predicted → Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Correct Detection
Actual ↓ Rate
Normal 9412 112 29 23 135 96.92%
DoS 167 5341 45 34 154 93.03%
R2L 1293 96 551 17 242 25.06%
U2R 12 6 3 10 6 27.03%
Probe 165 55 41 12 833 75.32%
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Table 6.5: Confusion matrix of the proposed cyber attack detection system on the
NSL-KDD test set (containing both old and new attacks).
Predicted → Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Correct Detection
Actual ↓ Rate
Normal 9430 88 41 26 126 97.11%
DoS 369 6654 60 34 341 89.22%
R2L 1022 287 801 25 419 31.36%
U2R 248 77 14 24 37 6.00%
Probe 318 121 43 27 1912 78.98%
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, a new distributed cyber attack detection system is proposed. The
proposed cyber attack detection system has relatively less computational complexity
and high detection accuracy. The proposed system uses multiple sensors across the
network. At each sensor, local processing is done and a local decision is generated.
All the local decisions are then sent to the fusion center, where the final decision
regarding the state of the network is generated.
Support vector machines are used as the supervised binary classifiers at each
sensor. Though the support vector machines are the best supervised classifiers, their
training is often a computationally intensive process. A new fast and efficient training
approach is proposed which greatly reduces the computational complexity of the sup-
port vector machine training process without significantly affecting the classification
performance.
Finally, the fusion rules are designed using the Dempster-Shafer framework, which
is a more generalized mathematical framework. The main advantage of using the
Dempster-Shafer framework is that it exactly characterizes the amount of evidence
available at each sensor. The Dempster’s rule of combination effectively combines the
evidence from the multiple sensors (sources of evidence).
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APPENDIX A
PROBABILISTIC OUTPUTS OF SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES
The support vector machine (SVM) does not provide probabilistic outputs. It just
makes hard decisions (predictions) about the new inputs, i.e., the support vector
machine (SVM) just gives a hard decisions whether the new input belongs to one
class or the other. Though these hard decision are based on the value of the SVM
function f(x), this value is an uncalibrated value and is not a probability. Posterior
probabilities, which gives the probability of a new sample belonging to a particular
class, are extremely useful in many practical applications. The posterior probabilities
are also very useful in situations when a particular SVM makes a small portion of the
overall decision, and the final classification decision is based on combining all such
individual SVM decisions.
Platt proposes a post-processing approach to calculate the posterior probabilities,
after training the support vector machine [10]. The proposed approach is a post-
processing step, and hence can be applied on already trained support vector machines
(SVMs). The basic idea is to fit a logistic sigmoid function to the outputs of an already
trained support vector machine. The proposed sigmoid model is
P (y = +1|f(x)) = 1
1 + exp(Af(x) +B)
, (A.1)
where A and B are the parameters of the model. The logistic sigmoid model (A.1)
is equivalent to the assumption that the output of the support vector machine is
proportional to the log-odds of the positive data sample. The parameters A and B of
the model (A.1) are found by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the training
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data:
min
A,B
−
q∑
i=1
ti log(pi) + (1− ti) log(1− pi),
where
ti =
1 + yi
2
,
pi =
1
1 + exp(Af(xi) +B)
.
(A.2)
The training set used above is R = {(f(xi), yi); i = 1, ..., q}. The above optimization
problem (A.2) is an unconstrained one. The targets which are actually used in the
above optimization problem (A.2) are ti ∈ {0, 1}. However, more effective targets can
be derived. These new targets ti represent the probability of the positive and negative
labels. The new targets are actually the MAP estimates for the target probabilities
of positive and negative samples, which are given by
ti

= N++1
N++2
, if yi = +1
= 1
N−+2
, if yi = −1
(A.3)
where N+ and N− are the number of positive and negative labels respectively. Thus,
the actual optimization problem that is solved is
min
A,B
−
q∑
i=1
ti log(pi) + (1− ti) log(1− pi),
where
ti

= N++1
N++2
, if yi = +1
= 1
N−+2
, if yi = −1
pi =
1
1 + exp(Af(xi) +B)
,
(A.4)
where N+ and N− are the number of positive and negative labels respectively.
The training set used in the above optimization problem (A.4), R = {(f(xi), yi); i =
1, ..., q}, needs to be different from the actual training set used for training the SVM.
This is due to the fact that using the same training set often leads to disastrously
biased fits. In [10], Platt proposes two different methods for deriving an unbiased
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training set: hold-out set method and cross-validation method. Here in our case,
the support vector machine (SVM) is trained on a subset of the actual training set.
Hence, we can use the other unused training set to fit the sigmoid. However, using
the entire unused training set at once may sometimes lead to wrong estimates of the
target probabilities, especially when one class dominates the other class. To eliminate
this difficulty, we divide the unused training set into three parts, and the trained SVM
is evaluated each of these three parts separately. Finally, the union of all these three
different sets of SVM outputs forms the new unbiased training set which is used to
fit the sigmoid.
Platt proposes a Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm to solve the optimization
problem (A.4). However, it is found that the proposed approach suffers from some
severe drawbacks [34]. In [34], Lin et al. propose a Newton’s method with backtrack-
ing line search for solving the optimization problem (A.4), which is found to be more
efficient. We adopt the Newton’s method with backtracking line search for solving
the unconstrained optimization problem (A.4).
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